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Abstract 
This paper deals with impact of secured 
environment on speech quality of IP 
telephony. There are presented the results 
of the analyzing of voice over secure 
communication links based on TLS. The 
using of secure network environments can 
affect a speech quality. There is the 
performance comparision of cipher 
alghorithms and description  how the used 
security mechanisms influence the final R-
factor. The presented results are based on 
numerous of experiments which have been 
performed in real IP network. 
1. Introduction 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a 
technology to construct a private network 
over public networks. OpenVPN [1] is one 
of the most popular software-based VPN 
products and has high flexibility. The 
usability of OpenVPN is high because 
offers a open-source, cost-effective and 
widely testet solution, not requiring expert 
knowledge. Software VPN products are 
popular, because they don't need any 
appliance and OpenVPN provides such 
solution which is based on matured 
protocols. The OpenVPN security model is 
based on SSL (Secure Socket Layer), the 
industry standard for secure 
communications via IP network. OpenVPN 
implements transport secure network 
extension using the TLS protocol 
(Transport Layer Security).  
 
On the other side the using of OpenVPN 
increases an overhead which is affected 
by encryption and this overhead can 
influence overall speech quality [2]. This 
paper contains a description of OpenVPN 
and its possibilities regarding a  
configuration, than there is explained a 
core of the matter which is the splitting of a 
RTP packet to equally divided blocks. 
2. OpenVPN and encryption 
TLS ensures a secured connection 
which is encrypted and decrypted with the 
keys negotiated during a phase of keys 
exchange. The key exchange and 
authentication algorithms are typically 
public key algorithms but subsequent data 
exchange is usually done by symmetric 
ciphers because of considerably faster 
processing. Of course, symmetric 
encryption is more suitable for IP 
telephony and this paper deals only with 
this type of ciphers [3]. TLS involves three 
main phases such as negotiation of 
supported algorithms, keys exchange and 
authentication and in the end symmetric 
encryption of transmitted data. 
 
The endpoint establishing VPN tunnel 
are declared one as server and the other 
as client. Before establishing the VPN, the 
client first reaches the server on a specific 
port, whereas the server doesn't need to 
reach the client. Configuration files are 
located in directory /etc/openvpn as 
server.conf or client.conf. The tunnel can 
be established on UDP or TCP, 
unfortunately TCP protocol is more 
widespread although UDP is more 
effective because of real-time applications. 
The most important information in 
configuration files is the type of cipher 
alghoritm because it affects the number of 
blocks and overhead as is shown in fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The number of blocks 
affected by CBC mode. 
The figure above illustrates the splitting 
of one RTP packet to N blocks. Every 
block has the same lenght which contains 
in case of AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard) 128 bits although the key size 
can be 192 or 256 bits but the block has 
the same size 128 bits. If another 
alghoritms are applied such as DES (Data 
Encryption Standard), Triple DES or BF 
(Blow Fish), then the block size is set to 
value 64 bits. A complete list of supported 
cipher alghoritms can be obtained as a 
result of command openvpn --show-
ciphers. The following ciphers and cipher 
modes are available for use with 
OpenVPN.  Each cipher shown below may 
be used as a parameter to the --cipher 
option. The default key size is shown as 
well as whether or not it can be changed 
with the --keysize directive.  Using a CBC 
mode is recommended. 
 
DES-CBC 64 bit default key (fixed) 
RC2-CBC 128 bit default key (variable) 
DES-EDE-CBC 128 bit default key (fixed) 
DES-EDE3-CBC 192 bit default key (fixed) 
DESX-CBC 192 bit default key (fixed) 
BF-CBC 128 bit default key (variable) 
RC2-40-CBC 40 bit default key (variable) 
CAST5-CBC 128 bit default key (variable) 
RC2-64-CBC 64 bit default key (variable) 
AES-128-CBC 128 bit default key (fixed) 
AES-192-CBC 192 bit default key (fixed) 
AES-256-CBC 256 bit default key (fixed) 
 
CBC means Cipher-block chaining, in 
this mode of operation, each block of 
plaintext is XORed with the previous 
ciphertext block and afterward is 
encrypted, that is why an initialization 
vector IV must be used in the first block, 
see figure 1. 
3. Used techniques of 
measurement 
The presented results in next chapter 
are based on series of measurements 
which has been performed in real network 
with OpenVPN and IxChariot [4], a scheme 
is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Logical scheme of testbed. 
     Whole traffic carried out between 
OpenVPN client and server was captured 
by Wireshark [5] and individual packets 
were analyzed. IxChariot is a software, 
produced by Ixia, which consists of the 
IxChariot console and IxChariot endpoints. 
The IxChariot console allows a selection of 
several test configurations, such as the 
used codec, timing, number of concurrent 
calls, test duration and so on. The test is 
initialized at the console, the conditions are 
uploaded into endpoints and consequently 
the test is performed. The results are sent 
back to the console. There was observed 
an influence of OpenVPN-TLS on 
overhead which has been increased and 
hence the required bandwith has been 
affected. 
4. Bandwith requirements 
The basic steps of speech processing 
on a transmission side are encoding and 
packetizing [6], [7]. RTP packets are sent 
in dedicated times and a difference 
between them depends on timing [8]. This 
process of packetizing is given by the 
following basic equation: 
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where t∆ [s] is timing in seconds, SP  [b] is a 
payload size and RC  [kbps] represents a 
codec rate. The timing can be derived from 
content of RTP packet as a difference of 
two consecutive timestamps, see relation 
(2). Typical value of a sampling frequency 
is 8 KHz. 
{N+1} {N}timestamp timestampt=
sampling_frequency
−
∆
 (2)                  
 
There is necessary to express a size of 
packet at application layer which might be 
defined by the following formula: 
AL RTP SS H P= +
 (3)          
 
where ALS  [b]  is the expected size that  
consists of RTP header RTPH  [b] and 
payload size SP  [b]. Equation (4) 
determines a size of frame FS  [b] at link 
layer.  
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FS
 [b] includes  a packet at application 
layer and the sum of lower located  
headers of OSI model where 1H  [b]  is media 
access layer header,  2H  [b]  internet layer  
header and 3H  [b] is transport layer 
header.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Bandwith as a function of 
payload size and concurrent calls. 
Figure 3 illustrates the relation between 
bandwith, payload size and number of 
concurrent calls. 
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Total bandwith MBW  [kbps], which is 
required in case of M concurrent calls, we  
express in relation (5) and if we apply the 
relations (1), (2) and (4) to the relation (5) 
so we obtain the following result (6). 
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We have to realize that TLS is located 
between two layers of OSI model, between 
application and transport layer and 
therefore we apply TLSS  instead of  ALS . This 
replacement should be done in respect of 
explained location of TLS and we define a 
new parameter  TLSS , size at TLS layer. TLSS  
is expressed in relation (7).  
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We use a symbol x   to denote the ceiling 
function where { }x min n  x  n= ∈ ≤   Z , it 
means that ceiling function of x  gives the 
smallest integer greater than or equal to x. 
The ceiling function was defined by M. 
Schroeder in 1991 [9] and the symbol was 
coined by K. Iverson in 1994. The 
parameter SB  represents a block size 
which has been explained in figure 1, its 
value is 64 or 128 bits and depends on 
applied cipher alghoritm (AES, DES, Triple 
DES or Blow Fish). 0C  is a constant and 
equals to zero in case of clear TLS 
unfortunately OpenVPN adds 
supplementary overhead that is included in 
0C . The value has been achieved by 
performed experiments, see picture 2. We 
can claim that this constant 0C = 83 bytes 
in case of block size 128 bits and  0C = 75 
bytes in case of block size 64 bits.  
5. Achieved results 
Relations stated in previous chapter 
have been confirmed by experiments, 
following figures illustrate how required 
bandwith is affected by TLS and 
OpenVPN. 
 
Figure 4. Comparision  of required 
bandwith for codec G.729  without 
TLS, with TLS and OpenVPN, Bs =64 
bits
 
Figure 5.  Comparision of required 
bandwith for codec G.711 without 
TLS, with TLS and OpenVPN, Bs =128 
bits 
The first column of table 1 contains codec 
G.729 and both variants of G.723.1. Block 
size has a length eiher 64 bits or 128 bits. 
This table provides the results for Ethernet 
without TLS, with TLS and with OpenVPN. 
Table 1. Values of required bandwith in 
various environments 
 
 
6. Impact on R-factor 
Lack of bandwith causes a loss in the 
first place hence the estimation its impact 
on R-factor is explained in this chapter. . 
Packet loss distribution can be modelled 
using a Markov process. A multi-state 
Markov Model is used to measure the 
distribution of lost or discarded packets or 
frames, and to divide the call into “bursts” 
and “gaps”.  The call quality is calculated 
separately in each state and then 
combined using a perceptual model, such 
as in VQmon [13]. The mentioned VQmon 
does incorporate G.107 compliant 
implementation of the E-Model. However, 
we applied a very simple method 
described in the last revision of G.107 from 
2005 [14]. The impairment factor values EI  
under packet-loss were tabulated for 
particular codecs. Robustness Factor plB is 
defined as codec-specific value. plB can be 
described as the robustness of the codec 
to packet-loss. Both values are listed in 
Appendix I of ITU-T G.113 and are 
available for several codecs. If we consider 
the Packet-loss Probability as plP , the  E EFI −  
impairment factor can be calculated using 
the formula: 
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BurstR
 is the so-called Burst Ratio, when 
packet loss is random BurstR =1 and when 
packet loss is bursty BurstR >1. For packet 
loss distributions corresponding to a 2-
state Markov model with transition 
probabilities p between a "found" and a 
"loss" state, and q between the "loss" and 
the "found" state, the Burst Ratio can be 
calculated as: 
1BurstR
p q
=
+  (9) 
Once the  E EFI −  factor is calculated it is not 
difficult to determine R-factor as an output 
of E-Model using implicit values of 
recommendation ITU-T G.107 which are   
0R =94,7688 , Is =1,4136 and A=0, hence 
we could modify the basic formula of R-
factor computing: 
 
93,3553 D E EFR I I −= − −
 (10) 
 
The model used to estimate DI  is 
described in [15]. Where it is explained 
that the effects of delay are well known 
and easily modelled. Delays of less than 
175 ms have a small effect on 
conversational difficulty, then 4DI T= ⋅  
where T is the delay in ms.  
7. Conclusion 
The real-time applications are very 
sensitive to packet loss, and each variation 
occurring on the network can modify and 
influence the final result of a real-time data 
transmission, such as a VoIP Call. On the 
one hand the defence techniques using 
cryptography such as OpenVPN reduce 
the danger of security threats but on the 
other side they affect the required 
bandwith of IP telephony which is 
significantly increased in case of 
OpenVPN. The presented relations in this 
paper help us to understand how 
OpenVPN and TLS can affect the 
bandwith of calls and how we can optimize 
the timing.  
 
For example we can show an 
optimalization at G.723.1 with 6.3 kbps, 
see table I. If we used a timing 30 ms 
during packetization, we would require 
30,4 kbps in case of TLS against 24 kbps 
in environment without TLS, but we could 
achieve better result with timing 60 ms, 
because we would require 17,33 kbps for 
TLS against 15,2 kbps without TLS and it 
is really much better ratio. This presented 
example is valid for AES due to size of 
blocks but the new created realations help 
to optimize any CBC encryption. 
 
The new contribution of this paper is the 
presented method of bandwith calculation 
in network using TLS. The achieved results 
were confirmed in testbed, the bandwith of 
any particular call was affected by length 
of cipher block and didn’t depend on key 
size. The results corresponded with 
relations stated in chapter IV. This paper is 
an extension of a previous work on the 
impact of security on the quality of VoIP 
calls [10]-[12]. 
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